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Imin;i the past several years I have often been asked to name sustainable 
agricultural credit programs in lai-incx:me countries (LIC::S) • ~ these 
J:eqlleSts causes me embarrassment, disappointment, su:r:prise, amazement, am 
puzzlement. My embarrassment canes fran bein;J able to name so f.ew sustainable 
programs, despite the tens of billialS of dollars o::mnitted to hurxireds of 
these efforts. At the same time, I painfully re•euh!r large 11llllb!rs of 
transitory credit activities that have been plagued by loan rea:NerY problems, 
dlronic depemerx:y an rutside fums, am excessive transaction costs. My 
qi sappointment stems fran seein;J little inprcvement in the perfomanc::e of these 
efforts sirre the mid-1960S when Chio state university began workin; an 
problems of rural finarx::ial markets (RFMs) • 2 While our unierst:arxliD; of how 
1Many of the ideas in this paper have been gleaned fran others who have 
bJrrowed mre deeply into info:cmal finance than have I. Frits BaJman am 
Clifton Barton gave me lectures years ago aln.rt the inportance of infonnal 
finance that I am only rDN beglllnirg to awreciate fully. J. o. van Pischke, 
Rebert Vogel, am colleagues at Chio state university have dale Dl1Ch of the 
research am original thinkirg an which I base my paper. Two anthropologists, 
Marie canavesi am Virginia Sardoval, also exposej me to info:cmal finance in 
Bolivia am the Ihlliwines. I also learned a great deal aln.rt infcmnal 
finance while attemin} an exrPJ lent seminar in the Fhil.iwines in early 1989 
sponsored by the Asian Develqnent BanJt am organized by P.B. Ghate. '!he 
refererx:=es at the em of the paper identify other in:liv:i.dnaJ s who have 
unwit:tllqly influex:ed my thinkirg an this tq>ic. 
2nus work was furxied by the Aqercy for Intemational Develcpnent (AID) 
am has involved research in m::>re than three dozen lai-incx:me cnmtries. '!he 
steady SURX>rt of our work by numeraJS AID enployees over the years is a proxy 
for the frustration many of them hart>or aln.rt rural credit projects. 
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RfMs furxtian ar¥1 what causes than to misfire ha& eGpanded substantially in the 
past two decades, ally in a 1lan:tt'ul of cases has this new kmrd.edge been ·med 
to treat WM ills. 3 I have gnd;Jin;ly cacll.l'.i!d that crea.tir¥,J sustainable 
au:al ·credit proc;p:ams is far DDre difficult to do than 1llCISt af us had 
ben!tofare tl:¥u;Jllt. 
Jr{ eatarrassmmt ard djsapp>inbaJt am t rcrec! by sm;m:ise. In reoaut 
mss cdl in Bolivia an:i the aiil.Ja!>i.nes-two caunt:rles Sl/lfferin;J substantial 
aocn:zdc st:r:ess-I ermmtered infal:ml. finara! thrivinJ a:i.dst. the rul:ble .of 
foimal. f.inancial JllE'kets. 4 It surprised 1lf! to see infc:mnal lerders manea:iDJ 
wt of their loans ·whi.l.e DBB.ttJy ·fiaJ:m! ·lerders uere znml'l in defaalts, an! i 
DEVel.ed at the ability mt infmml finan::2 to -*dlize au! aJ l•leate 1mge 
aaamt:s of voluntm:y savi.nJs, while banks attracted .:relatively few depaait:s .. 5 
"' emcnent ar:ises ·fD:a the eoumast in the types of pecple sm:wd by 
fmml ant infa:maJ f.i.natPe akn; with the diffemnces in types .of serrioes 
pm:wided. FoJ:ma1 finance tfpically :involves 1m:ge l.oans .aid deposits, seam! 
ml.lateral, relatively lcn;J-"tem 'f:inan:ial inst:rm&e11t:s, am ·lsgal baddttg. 
PcmlBl finame also .-rvioes llaltly inlividm1s who al.'e ttle ca-. de la c::z:tme 
but We .. required to a:lle to the f:i.narcial. institutial to transact their 
~ inten!stAd in further details on t.be pa:lb:Lems in i:ura1 finan:ia1 
mrkets aa wll as in the aew vials an how to 1:8SOlve scae ·of these pr:d:>1enB 
mi~ .mrer to the volumes by .Ialald an:.t by Adml&, ·Grahmn, am Ven Pisdl1ae 
cited at tte end of the psper. 
41he varicu; tams ·used in the li~ to C2Etagorize finmciai Jllfldrets 
bicllde J.mt.itRth:ml 81d JPAimtituticgl, QJSMPed ani 1.11\QCaaulzei, 
DPOD' am ~, w!!os;ial am rop•1ercial, ppxhpt:ic:l1 am 
SRIBlll2ti&x11 ard fqrpl a.rd WOL"Ml. I feel llDte amifc>r'table with the latter 
tMD tetm ard ·use the 1:im:D fqm1 town all finm¥:ial. t:ransactians that .are 
~, DKJU.latael, md DIJllitored by sane oent:r;al financial. or·~ 
autha:rity. ·9Je ··term . ir>fnrnl'] finmp! ·~ 111esses all other ·finarcial 
activities in an .eoonany. 
~ rapo1ts siltlilar cxn:litions in senegal in the early 1980S. 
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business. In contrast, infcmnal finance frequently involves small loans am 
deposits, 0 1111nnl.y functia'lS without collateral, typically deals with shart-
tenn transactia'lS I and Often q>erates in the legal shadows. Many participants 
in the infOl.'DBl. system are poor peqtle, wanen, q>erators of small businesses, 
small fm:mers, arrl the larnJ.ess--peq>le who are often unable to cmtain fcmnal 
financial services. Unlike the fcmnal financial system, transactia'lS in 
infcmnal finance usually occur at the doorstep of clients, at their place of 
work, or in pcp1l.ar markets. I am amazed that informal finance can provide 
these services to the peq>le it does without dlcki.n;J ai expenses am drowninJ 
in defaults. Like the aeronautical. en;inee.rs who have analyzed bees am 
cxn::luded they shculd not be able to fly, I am oawirx::ed that informal finance 
defies the laws of financial gravity. 
Further, I am puzz1ed by the ability of informal finance to provide 
sustained financial services to lm'ge 111mbez's of inlividuals who have been 
targets of tenp:>rary or sporadic fcmnal credit progxams. '1bese formal credit 
efforts are usnally staffed by educated people who receive extensive tectmical. 
assistan::e frail both donors am gcvemments alcn; with anple access to both 
subsidies am cxn::essiaiary fU!Ds. Even with these advantages, famal ml 
credit efforts often fauxJer, while infcmnal finance, which enjoys ncme of 
these advantages, typically flairishes. success in financial transactia1S 
~to be inversely related to years of edlicatiai of the participants, 
tectmical. assistance received, access to OJnOeSSialaey funds, am extent of 
regulatiai! '!his raises two inpJrtant questia'lS: Why do fcmnal agricultural 
credit pzcgrcsns so often fail? An:i, why do info:cnal. financial activities so 
often succeed? Space limitatia1S oblige me to deal mainly with the latter 
questiai hem. 
T@diticgtl ·w.. Aba¢ lnfq1nf!] ftwpe 
Weaaal forms of lerxilng-particularly JID'leY'l~ .~as 
tlein;J evil in .many ·ail:turea.. Poets, ·prq!ilets, playwrights,., .aJXl p:>liticizms 
twfte po-intied arcwia; fincJers at infcmnal. lenders -an! ~ ·itbe -OCmfatt of 
~ after-li£e -~the :heq~ .of ~history. ·.~as 
~ as ~" ·Sbel.JLey, Shakespeare, llarX, the PJ:qbet :fl:bmmed., a:m 
·~ of the .21.a ·~ have vented their spleens an tbe ·sq.p:ad evils af 
.:lrllle!Y ledirrJ.. ilejorative am el!Dtive tei:ms such es PA1QP2list, mnnr,, 
UiLSG}t, ~Qin~, ;ard §J!Plqitg' eo:lcr disalSSiCl'lS of this tcpic. I knaw of 
. ., other' a:aa ·in developaamt ·tillbe:tle .anecdotal :banur ··st::ades am t:old .aid ~ 
:tlO often to l'JUrture traditianal views (Nell.scmj • For 'DI!{ tastes.~ too mny 
'(l!isoJSSials of ~ lerd.:inJ incl.Wie ~iall. anl etimie ~ mtJ«1thtg 
tbe .da;dc .td.de ·of .tumm ~= e.9., bh,ses against .Jews in ·Bnq!e., avers us 
O.inesG! in Fast .Asia., ID:Hans m East Africa, I.bas in West Africa~ ad. paqpi1e 
As tbe Mlttn e Fast in Lttin AmerWa. ..,__ a.ta.es ·al.9c> 1!lbem fr<lm u. ~ 
~ tiO tea.?' ~ ~ an activity, such as fimncial iftte1:mdiati'Clft, 
Utat 1s poarly .\lnderstoocl an:i, to sane alba.erwars, mysterkus ~ • 
4eN m what was Cblmial Inila or by sociologists cd anttmp>l.ogists. 
Stn:ti es jJy' Dlrlin:J &Bi others in Wia in the easrly 19008 Shaual ttm: infamel 
JAn:lilq pawided lDClll!lt of tbe loans in .rural areas ml t.bat ·the intemst ·rates 
ai:pl::<~ :)ft;en ~ Uum ·those ~ by mtlm in either J.ntia .ar tbe 
ltU.t...i Kin;f, a. sutisequent st:JaUes in IBlia :nfa:iaJ ly tbe All-~ 
Qlldit ~ ~ Git each decade s.UX. the early 195as-set tbe arJl!Dll. 
•f« .- of tbe ~ mae.Bldl and poliey dial"9'Je en infamal f.inalre in at:ber 
~. 1bis agenda was qenemlly negative in tone am stressed &::oaad:UIJ 
/ 
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the :celative bp:ntan::e of infcmnal. finance, the extent of DDqx>l.y profits in 
these transactia'IS, hew loans linked to other marketin;J activities Jooost:ed 
profits, and the extent to which infcmnal. lendllq was used to~ land 
pledged as collateral (e.g. , Gbcse, wai) • 
I am uneasy with this ste:reotypin;i and with the associated research. 
Instead, I feel there are inpntant lessais to be learned frail Dl:>m cbjective 
stDiy of infOJ:ma.l. finance-lessais that will be overlooked as laJ1 as w insist 
ai d1asfD1 bogeymen in research at infcmnal. finance. '1'akin; a fresh look at 
infcmnal. finance shalld involve stlliyirg the services provided al<n;J with the 
associated tedmiques, practices, and tedmologies used. careful analysis of 
infcmnal. finance may also provide cleamr insights into the types of finarclal 
services irdivi.dnals and fi.J:ms fini to be 1ll:ISt useful. 
Tvpe§ of Inf orma1 Finarpe 
F:iname exists because of heterogeneity aJllD:1 fhms and iniividna]s and 
because of the specializatiat and trade that ensues frail these diffm:alCeS. 
'!his, in turn, results in a variety of financial needs which are partly met by 
a ml.tiplicity of infomal arraBJE!1D9111:. lthile the stereotyped 11D1SYlerD!r 
receives m:ist of the plblicity, a large variety of other arrcm;JEID9l'lt bmlle 
1ll:ISt infomal. finan::ial transactiai in LICs. Sane of these~ am 
centuries old, while other systems of infcmnal finance are a:mstantly evolviDJ 
as the ccntcurs of the society and the eccn:my charqe. '1he kaleid.oscq>e of 
~ defies s:inple classificatiai, and it is umsnal to fini a 
substantial rnnnher of these ~ that are identical-a t:estiDa1y to the 
flexibility and creativity involved in infonnal finance. For purposes of 
illustratfD1 the variety fcmn in these systems I briefly describe ten types of 
infcmnal finance. Although I treat these ten types separately I it is 0 Mjl!Ql 
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for thenr to overlap am also to i:.- i.nterttrined witb ~ ~ or 
1'lllrkatinJ activiti• (sanietatl•} • 
~g¢etf - !p!p;mjtatef InlJtiMjqw 
Dr~~, incll.X!:i.n} the· tbn:f.ni.am lllptldk" a.t••ta, aid 
trdia, ~i.alt«I :f.fnmc:i:al .inatit:utia. Gist t!Jat .. :lnf"cm-1 mly Jin Qe 
-- t;bd. tnay .. not ~. 1!W inRi.totims. a.ct. lilla ~ 
J:anJm m:f. an· ofta1. lQc::at.ad in bankliJtra. ofticm tmt 41-.1 to JdciDa-· aid 
~-- cl.ieftb.. 'lbily' Cid.st primarlly to ~ tw ar "'9'1latiaa. In 
.-cw t:h9y my be aft'il.iated with bm1cs t2a\.1 tjl jQint OWlmSbip er ~ 
~. ~ :t&Wtt: llf"Udi·• saqi&iJt tllat tf11 n· maeg.ulataS m:gaaizatiaw 
~· :r:911S«lable inb!r.Wt rats an!' q:mata witb mld'"'C U.tt I' 'tim casts 
Ofayaa', Vogal, i.imar). 
~ ....,. apmd Sl8't of tbah' tim lerd:in:J· na-i ~ w:e 
~ SOtll'Olll ~ lcmw . ..w:r m Asia. 1'Pfatlly, their lc:mis an 
gzlblbal tor 111tmt. parl.oda, m:11 uma::ma:I by CJOllatatal, md am atadrad to 
~ C'J.ialbf., a.t Jll'Dlyle'dars qmata en a mil a:ala, atand loma 
minly t'JUt Of am.r· ain tf.lldl, anS raat:d.ct l8'ding to J.w; tmm. a Jmrduad or 
- indivi<f-1•. Jlb11ylerdlllm typically dmga intar:mt xatas tlat. .. IWlb. 
nJ.atiw ta othllt· ldtdml· bJt atel.i laar& qpidly m:I f PllQll8 ~ 1::r:wtJ:m 
cDt9 di ~.. in- l•dl:m opa:ate in localUed md:ats ed. oftm have 
M9b!Y panaali.S ~ wit:h ~. 
'Iha min ~ baW ovar· torwl lAl!mem is the 
caap;lll ..... infonat:1m tblJ' 8CS'mnl.ata aboUt their climts tbm:ll#I day-to-
&ly ~. T~ m:1 Aiyar fan! an exb:w ftMIU ~ this "81 they 
u1t:at an tnUan lld'JIYll!l'dar h:.:W· bl decided to ta1ca cm &Hiticnll clientsi he 
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respamd that he had never had a rew client. Urx3erst.amably, the prq>d.etaey 
nature of this informaticn causes JIDleYlerners, as well as other infO?llBl 
lemers who heavily rely en inside in.formatior:r to be leery abcut sharin:} 
caniid information abcAit their qleratioos with :researc::hers (Cllan:lavar:Xar). 
Merdlants 
A closely related an:i 111.lCh 100re CXllllIDil form of informal credit is pnwided 
by iniividuals who are primarily merdlants tut 'Who also extern loans linked to 
the sale or purchase of OJ•u•odities (Bardhan, Floro, Harriss, M::teod). 
Typically, l~ is only a minor part of the merchant's activities, loans are 
repaid in relatively short periods of t:ime, many of the loans carey :rx> explicit 
interest charge, ani the len:ler may adjust the price of the cu1u1r:dity involved 
in the transact.icn as c:xmpensatian for the loan. F.canani.es of scq>e are the 
ma.in advantage that a merdlant realizes in prcviclirq loans. Merdlants can 
generally sell ioore fertilizer or purchase ioore rice, for exanple, if they also 
offer loans to their custaners. Like the ncneylerxier, merchants have the 
advantage of possessin.;r inexpensive informaticn abOJ:t the borrower that is 
acnmllated thrrugh p.n:dlases ani sales of cx:nm:xlities. tJn:ier normal 
oorxlitions the volume of loans provided by merchants ir¥::reases as 
cxmnercialization expams. 
sane itinerant peci31.ers also provide small short-term loans to custaners. 
In the Brll.i:r;pines, peci31.ers--often called Banbaies-sell items as diverse as 
umbrellas, electric fans, cosmetics, an:i clot:hirq door-to-door in rural areas. 
'Ibey often make their village raJrrls an a daily or weekly basis to sell goods, 
take orders, an:i collect installment payments on previa.JS p.n:dlases. Fr.uin 
reported similar services provided in rural areas of Inionesia durin;J the 1930s 
by "installment chinamen." 
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still another fom of infcmel finance is pawnin;J, one of the old st 1br:ms 
of len:li.DJ. Salle pmmbnl1Gers watk ful.l-tble at this cxx:qatial, 1iberaas others 
pm it• a s.idel:ine to m:nsy 1adinJ ar 11111DitinJ. ra ....at. c:cuntries, 
In:lmlasia aid Sri ~ far -.anple, w pmmst-.rp am atTi 1 iatad with banlcs. 
~-- features of~ are that they typically JIB1ca wall loans 
for shart pm:1ads aid resolve tbe loan c:ollatemlizaticn .pr:dll.aa ilwexpndvely 
- requirinJ Jxr.rawm:s to ~ collataral. PlJ'sically for loans {I•• mte) • 
ti.ilra ma, ....YJ.adl!IES, am b:a4em, pawnbrctam tad alprwt no infoDat:icn 
ebcut tbe.ir borl:tJwam mleas thetf are 1Bey abaat recei.vin) sto'lan gcads. '1he 
pawnbroker J:aal.izes ravmue f%aa illtmast cm leans an:! fJ:all the dittemnce 
bltwaen loan ammnts aid sales raceipts fraa ital& ~ as sacarity en 
datMlltat loans. Q:11tzaey to acnvant:imal. wi-:Jcw, Bar~ and Jblb&n m:ga.a 
tat. mat pawrbtdaats pmtm to.__ i:ndividl•l• nw'la• tile itallS ·the¥ i-m. as 
t!ds Dproves tbe cbanCles .of tbe1r ocntiminJ - clients. 
·Sma irdivid!•l • in the ~ ma1ca tbeir llvinJ pri.mrll.y by 
a:nb::t::in; :lnfcrmal pmminJ apm:ati.cns a:mbimd with pcMl ·inJ !tans daar-to-
daar t.bat are .Id; redased. 1.tbeaa individlJ!llls "lllrf have loose tlDdd.nJ 
~ with fanel ~ ar with mlati~y 1111111lthy pecple 1ltK:> 
occas.kmlly p:ari.de tmn ·c:ipamtitq capital. n., my 'also a:mbina tDeir 
paminJ activities with •l l inJ .ncqawned 9XdS dccz-to-c:b:r ·am ·offarinJ 
imd;aUJWlt ~ cm these sales (Mam and Simloval.). 
Arottwc qpa of infaullll fi1Jan:2 is carriecl cut by loan J:nakm:s WbD 
fw:ilitata aad·ads illDJ1 pac:ple with nxay to lad and 'bcrJ:owm:s bl' t:adinJ an 
imiCla ~ alx11t patantial clients. Typically, loans bardled ~ 
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broke.rs are :relatively large an:i for a lORJer term than are DXJSt informal 
loans. Virtually anyone can enter the b.lsiness who is able to assemble 
infonnatiat abcut potential clients. Because borrowers of these brokered loans 
often do not qualify for additiaial bank credit, interest rates ai:plied to 
these loans may be :relatively high. As I.arson points a.rt, sane of the lemers 
in Bolivia insist on collateral sudl as :real estate before makirg a brokered 
loan. 'll'le broker is usually not a principal in the transaction :rut mezoel.y 
arnm;IeS contacts between lemers am borrowers. sane brokers may also provide 
collectiat or guarantee services an:i tlrus hecnne m:re like principals than 
agents. 
A different fonn of loan broker operates widely in rural areas of 
Ban;Jladesh. '1hese brokers obtain loan awlication fonns fran banks, help 
illiterate people fill them a.rt, obtain necessa:cy signatures ard guarantees, 
an:i also allcx:ate bribes necessa:cy to overcane barriers to ~ (Malooey 
an:i Ahmed). '!be broker is 01111auy :rewarded through a share of the bribe or a 
share of the loan ard acts as a legal tuffer between the payer ard receiver of 
the bribe. 
I.an:ilords 
Althc::ujl the practice is less CCl11llDll rDI than previously, sane lard:Jwners 
still provide their tenants with loans. 'll'le main reason for this is scope 
ecoranies. '1hese loans facilitate access to labor arxi ent:rep:reneurial skills 
that might otherwise be difficult to enploy or manage. Typically, lanilo:rd 
le:rxliIXJ declines in :relative inp:>rtan=e with lan:i :refonn an:i with the expansion 
of other types of fonnal ard infonnal finance (Sacay, hjabin, arrl TolY'lloco). 
A variant of this occurs when lan:iowners who borror,,r m:>ney r..:ransfer to a 
lender usufruct rights aver lan:i, orchards, or fishing facilities for a time 
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mtil loam an repaid. 'Ibis m::t•ISJN•lt is u"*"'IJ in tile hif#OanJs t1 ..,_,,,.. 
am anrDJ cacao fa.J:.IDS'tS in E2aa (Jidejel::aafe). It is al.st incl! sb:rJ1y :tam in 
tfie Hdli.wines, "'*'8 fa11l111B11 my JBWll tile title to sane Of their lam ad 
~ .,.. rf9hts to tbe ladm: tar a the· to ctJtain relati~y la'ga. lmns 
to f.illm»· ~ abEtJad by a family J11M•er. 
~ tbe wt o. &:l't fm:ll of inft:Jrwlj finance, mth in tED& of , •• .,, 
mr! vaim of aansactiaa, .is loans trc:m :f:r:ienfB am relati.'W!S. ni m 
a:ultri8 tt rra c::ralits mJae ap balf ar m r1. all brfOIMl lmns. l!lmy of 
th1111 Jalnl. involve no intawst er mllateral, t:b!r'-.r be la:nJe. er -11, aal 
mny at tbese leans is recip:ccity: the ape =tatian tbst. ti& b:a:tm .is 
will.in; to p:owida a lmn to tbe l.ader a:wttaa in the :fubae (Plat:teau ani 
»&al-). In c•aa tG&l:e tlla Jnti.YicJmls inual"V8:1 lave scmt ax s to d:bar 
fC&m of t:.imnc:a, the ~«city J11!1Y be an iap:a:t:ant wy of 1lllll!lgirq 
uncart.aint.y am risk tim:D#l •tablistdtq am st:ca:qll!B)iDJ immpenuial. ties • 
.... e-m 
.ltDtMr fClm of infcmml finance is the aD!J' gua:al, a respcndble pe1sa1 
1llJo atJ1 as t.o safeguard c:asb fer in:lividl•ls. Qab&a and olllets mpca:t finling 
... ..., 9"'"'8 in lfiger I Malcmay ad Ahmed also fan! tbm in Bm'ql.adesb, am 
Bclwen aal a:nt-n Iepact siwilar ari:atiJElili!llts in IJdi.a. Almst the mtiJ:e 
DBICl'I fer ......, gmr:ds is that they otter a sacm:e place to depasi.t fUnds. In 
.:st cues ttmse depwi.ts earn no interest, altbal!Jh nmey guaJ:ds may give 
dlp:aitam tdal taacs or gifts. 'lher:a are no mstrictia1S ai the uses BDi!!!f 
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guards may make of deposited tums. In saie cases dep:Jsitors feel guards are 
doin:J them a favor by holdin:J their iooney, ard the anomt of m:mey deposited by 
each in:lividual is usually small. 
Nonrotatioo Savims ard Credit Grgp 
Another inp:>rtant fonn of informal f inarx:e is nonrotatin:j savin;s ard 
credit groups. '1hese consist of inlividuals who either regularly or 
irregularly, deposit fUr¥js with a group leader (e.g., Begashaw: MalaleY am 
Ahmed) • In JOOst. cases these groups are fonned spantaneo.Jsly, but in 'lhailam a 
government agency-the cammmity Developnent Oepartnent-plays a :role in 
organizin:J such groups. 'lhe main prc:blem these groups resolve is the px>lin:J 
of savin;Js, am it is not urmlllOJ1 for these nd:>ilized f\.nDs to be deposited in 
banks. While these groups may collect f\.nDs regularly, they do not distril:ute 
them anx:n; members through aey systematic :rotation. '1hese groups are part of a 
larger class of informal groups that p.rrsue a variety of p.n:p:JSeS ran;Jin:] fran 
c::arxiuct.:in: financial intel:ne:liatian to taxirg groop members to inprove plblic 
facilities. 
sane groups pericxlically collect f\.nDs fran members am then return the 
anwnts deposited to savers at the em of a given period: these are essentially 
contractual sav:irgs programs. Instead of ret:mnin; contributions to memhem, 
other groups use iooney collected as emergency loan fums. Group members are 
essentially b.ti.l.din;J reciprocal credit possibilities through their deposits. 
In other cases, the f\.nDs collected may be used to invest in ente?:prises that 
are administered by the group. Sane groups are managed by ccmnission agents, 
while others are nm by voll.mteer leaders. Varioos forms of these groups can 
be fcun:l in JOOst. low-in::ane nations, but they are especially .important in 
Africa am in Islamic camtries. 
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ill6CM 
A m CX11plicated fom of 9t'Cl:c> finance is called J:OtatinJ Sillflirgs am 
credit associations -~> . 1h!y are fcmd in mmy r..rcs am have been 
atAnld.vely sb:died, especially by sociologists ml autbEq• ~st=s (Ba'P'Pn). 
Jn a nJll!her of aw m .iD!.ividuals pm:ti.ci,pl1lte in ~ t:lml mve dealiigS 
with ~J .firarx:ial imtitutiaB, am l.Rge sr:ua ot :a:uey my be invalved 
{Adima m1 Clni!Ymi). Recent mseard1 by Sctriedllr in C'alea:m •r;:JJl!St-' tbe 
¥01.ume ot dlp:Bits mriDJ thrcu;Jh ms the:t'e 1IBY be la:tg11r than tbe anr::uit:s 
bal.d in banks. In m cxxantries, especially ··mac:n:J ethnic minariti.es,, ms 
a:r:e a priJmy way of :r:aisinJ turds to m1ce laz:ge blsinem .i.mM&'••d::s (~ 
8.1). 
'Dlese associatiana are pu:t:ic:Ularly int:ar:estinJ beamae they explicitiy 
pz:l1 savirl)I ard. tie lCllJ'8 ta dep:3its. Kl9C1IS also msolve the lam 
CDllatetal an.1 ~ frd!uawt:kn prxi:>l.818 by mmiµn; cml.y -•e:s wm have 
mtrial OCX1fidsnce in Md1 other ar by bavinJ ~ who guarantee the 
par:£oaanae of inlividn1'1 a they enrcl.l. Loan rec:x:MB:Y is seldra a prc:b1.em in 
ms beau1• a defaJJ]tirg i••er not all.y loses the q:p:rtunity to remain in 
the amaciatim but 8Jff also be shunned am axperi.ax2 the lees of socjaJ am 
business ties that aco "IMln.Y mait•t11bi.p (Velez-Ibanez) • 
It is smpriainJ hDw oft.en ·~ are feud .am:n;J enplc:rpel of fai:mal 
financial ~. Many of tb! 'WCrkm:s in the Hatia1al cra:lit uai.ai 
Pederati.on in axca .... , Bolivia, for ec&nple, m:e members of ms 
(pallanakus). ~ ·'WDl1d..n; for the Devel.q::neut Finance cmporaticms in beth 
91!) ize am st. Kitbl/NeVitl regularly participate in ~ (synlicates ard 
PBta••) . ~ employees of c:ammclal banks ard oautzal banks in Belize 
ml Bolivia am also m marbers. '1bese associations likewise operate am:n:J 
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enployees of the Central Banks of the Daninican Replblic (sans) an:l the 
:Rrllippines (paluwagans) • In 1987 there was even a ImCA operatin;J anrn:J 
erployees of the Intematialal. Monetaey Fln'rl in wash.:inJtal, DC, all of whD had 
doctoral degzees in econanics or finance! 
'!he case Against Exoloitation 
Critics IOOSt often cite exorbitant interest rates as the main 
justification for corxienntlnq infonnal finance. cases of leniers c:harginJ 10 
percent per day on loans, for exanple, are cited arxi then generalized as bein1 
representative of exploitation arxi proof of Da'lCp>ly paver. Also cited arxi 
generalized are horror stories about diabolical ~leniers or merchants who, 
in o:r:de.r to capture the borrower's collateral, extern loans to irxlividrials whan 
leniers laDI will be unable to repay, debts that are inherited by the 
borrower's children, larxilords who tie their tenants to larxi throogh debt at 
the crmpmy store, arxi merchants who link loans to repayment in Jdn:i arxi force 
bo~ to repay with products that are grossly UOOerpriced (Basu, :Bladuri) • 
'1hese horror stories illustrate situations that are only possible when the 
len:ler exercises a large measure of 100110p0ly power. Also, they report one-time 
operations that nonnally do not make econanic sense for leniers who benefit 
fran sustained relationships with their clients. 
'Ihese blanket irxlicbnents, iooreover, ignore the large nunber of infcmnal. 
loans made at nDiest interest rates, the Dllltitude of loans made arxi repaid 
without the lerxier foreclosi?x.:J on collateral, arrl the c:arplexities involved in 
loans tied to marketi?x.:J an:l production. '!hey also ignore the extensive deposit 
m:i>ilization that cx::curs in these markets, the nrultitude of informal loans made 
with no collateral involved, an:l the large number of people who pay high 
interest rates on their loans but realize even higher rates of retunl on 
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critics also fail to mmtial tfBt 
aneylendets may make auy a few loans at exb:emel.y high interest rates, that 
these credits am often Ul'llleC'J:t'lld, am tl'lat borrowers payinJ the highest rates 
)ave. lat cndit ratmJB. Critics also~ i.nfl.at.ia1. :In the mid-1980& 
WorDBl lerXfam in Bolivia ~ mwe lest p.m:i'lasi.n:J power m tbeir loans if 
tblly had cnly dm:ged 10 pez:cent per week '1bile inflatim roared ala'g at a 
rate of ll!l!Veral t1'lalsanl percent per year. 
It is also i:Dp:Jrtant. to r•eh!r that DBl'J¥ ot,· t1le lams with so called 
~ interest rates are llllBll and am for very short perla!s. It is o n 
in Iatin America, for ftaill>le, for sb:eet. vendor:s to bm:nJw ocradaally .in tile 
SJminJ erDJgh fums to CXIV'llr their sales for the day am tben to repay loam 
in the evenin;J. A typiaU loan JfB'f .be fa: aU.y ten ck>l.lam am 't'Pq'ire 
D!plYIE!nt of elAMi!n dollars, an anrmai interest ram of ova:" J,ooo peu:ett. lit 
t:tJe same time, the loan my alloN' the vaxka:' to meJize daily aKDinJs that am 
....-al times the ~ ot tbe lam. It is unlikely that B>mlists ..wd be 
.-et with a mm:ctlant tiilO ecb day sold. the amne kin:! of nercbaDlise to a 
wn:!al: b1t adda1. a DlfTblP of 10 percent to the price of the goal, a t:r.:ansai:tim 
tbat did D:Jt involve a lean. 
At least tbi• qµestias JSJSt. be ansum:ad to establ isb trilletber leu:lm:s are 
t:aJ'c:hrJ UB3ue aduantage of ~: (1) 1llat am a lerder's qp:xrtunity aJSts 
ot turm and the risks imlolwd in l..enlinp (2) Are lllJSt infm::ml lenlem in a 
pcsi;t:icn to ax:tract mco::pll.y profits? Arn (3) a:ra c:::r:ati.t t.ransactialS linked 
with nmkat:lng am ~ to enhance exploitatiai? 
lk:h ._. b!lell. asserted about the ubiquitaJs naqx>ly ~ of 
anl!Ylm•""'•, mt little p:cot' has been pa: sented to awi>i:t this all.egaticn. 
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studies by Sin#i an:i Harriss of mneylenders in India, alcn; with a simj 1 ar 
stmy by Wil.mirgt:al in the SUdan, show that naieylemers' interest rates are 
high because the cpportunity ocsts of fums together with lenlirq risks are 
high. 'lhese :researchers argue that it is unreasa'lable to expect nawylerders 
to dlarqe borrowers less than the rate of retum lemers could xeal i ze ai 
altemative invesbnents an:i that many mneyleniers have business altm:natives 
that yield high marginal retw:ns. 'lbe high interest rates in infornal markets 
may largely irxlicate that :fums are scarce am that at least sane peq>le 
realize high rates of retum fran usilg bor:ra#ed tums. 
Olristen makes the same point frail the pm:spective of borrowers in Iatin 
America. He argues that many managers of microenterprises borrow fran 
mneylemers at high rates of interest because of the low transaction ocsts 
involved arxi the high quality arxi depermbility of the info?lDal finarcial 
services arxi also because high rates of retum result fran the use of borrowed 
fun:Js. Many of these high return activities are also available to lerders arxi 
are further irxlications of high cpportunity CXlSts of lenlirq. 
In addition, because of the seasonality of agricultural productiC11, 
informal lenders my fird it invssible to keep all of their mney lent duriDJ 
the entire year. '!his forces them to dlarge higher interest rates durirg the 
time their mney is lent to make up for periods when sane of their loanable 
fun:Js are idle. 
!blopoly Profits 
Because of the lack of barriers to entry, the lcm:Je number of fODDS of 
finance, arxi the large number of people who are willin;J to enter markets where 
high rates of retum are :realized, it is difficult to see how infornal lerders 
can regularly extra.ct substantial llXXlqX>ly profits. All of the many fcmns of 
infODDal ·f:i.mn:re, ·as well es fcm:'Jllll. leders, partially aw11i!Sbe: ·.wi:t:a ·adl ·atlher. 
·r.n a&litian, anya"Je with IlllD!!Y or easily transferable :rasaura!IS ·mil becnne a 
i1lz=dre;, :bmi:w&Jam can ow1111.ete witll klfcmnal 1adel!:s tlmmagh ·mllrstd'lt:d"iml ·Bf 
ltl!QUi't:;y for debt,, tarter., .md sale an:I ~ <af « i l!lb. ·!\:Ir ea*'llite, ±f 
f.aoers lave .been~ •'.fmds f!l'.tl1l D131111!Ylmdet'S ·to pay Cilllh D!i1t .Q'l fm:m 
lard, tiley am instead 'rent lanil m 1l ·share .basis :f?.all ~ .Alm,, the 
ll8aSml peaple .mve11ta1 mney 1s ·t:11at it ·will ~ far ., :IBD.f ~utta: 
t!bi'fX,JIS, laXt. ltbe 191 n• :is alsc tme: ·JllllnY tbin1Js are ~ sktibttes fbr 
• mcderated 11y et*"'in9' ·;lbnpaj) 1.eidinrJ. 'mo m fmlly ·eflfiec u.e., b::&wau&,, ·ne 
"'l>f'nsicm .in fat'JBl r;,...1111St nc4ete witb Umae U!B!JIJbs af 1iE Dfarmel 
apt• tbSt .lvme little a:1ip9ti.ti.am.. An q1111sim of ·dnap lbJ•ll la.ms :tbait 
.... 
.It is .Q'f\tan dittiadt to estm;lJ isb 'Cllslllrl.y t:tae r!hltt11es ·timt am .eq;pl.W tic 
l.oans 111184 tile .'kam er the DE!Jl&.tJEl1lo ... in kb.d, • is aftBI tile -case with 
J:.aans :aa.., m .. 1cwttng.. 1lm' ·l!Kdi'J:itl~ •, .. rt:.,.. m S1:dm1...,. agme ·m .l'l.sd 
a ·fa:r:nm bD SBdts of m;i n bd· ard zieqtJim the .~ of 1::tm!e SillCb at 
la!c7.1aat 1:im .ht aDlf' .tliJD au1hs.. 'On a au• dity basis, ·this . .,.mt;s to a 
aatidy .Lrit&:.est D&ta alf 25 pezomlto ·ar an ;mw1ael mte of •~ paamt. OD a 
fhad•l 'hFts11 amueoerir ·'die zstre is 1llJCil lawer,, ewm. igr:a:inJ infl1!11timl. 
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Usually, the market price of millet bebieen harvests is significantly higher 
than the price durinj harvest. If the interharvest price ~ fnn 25 to 50 
percent higher than harvest prices, the interest rate ai the loan '1t'alld rarqe 
fran o to 120 percent ai an anrrua1 basis. When loan :repayment is in kin:i, the 
merchant assrnoos all of the price risk, sanethin:J that is of additicnli value 
to the borrower. If a merchant in fact coosistently realizes a mnopoly profit 
ai his millet-credit transactions, the cause may be iltperfections in the millet 
market rather than mncpoly power exercised in credit transactions. '!he 
merchant may own the only truck in town that is needed to haul millet to 
central markets, but it is less likely that the merchant will be the a'lly 
person in the area who has rums or resoo.rces to lam. If IIDl'lOpOly power lies 
in other markets linked to informal finance, that power will not be directly 
affected by finance activities or their regulatiai. 
While I have not systematically studied linked credit transactions, I have 
talked with a large mnnher of merchants in variais comtries who provide loans 
to sane of their custaners to facilitate pirdlases or sales of goods. I have 
yet to fim a merchant who '1t'alld oot prefer cash transactions over these 
involvin:] credit. '!his suggests to me that IOOSt merchants view leniin:;J as a 
neces.sary nuisance rather than as a way to sweat additional profits out of 
their clients. 
Moneylemers as Hospitals 
Sane so-called malignant informal lemers are mainly involved in providin;J 
small, short-tenn loans that are seldan backed by collateral ani that are made 
to Wividuals who often suffer econanic reverses. It is this pa.rt of infOJ:lDal 
finance that is a lightnin;J rod for criticism of informal finance in general. 
1# 
D1stMd of ~irlj M ettU th8 Wcmal len.!lers '1il». ~ this 
tftffiCUl.t let of clients, i~ lily bl :IDft' Ui!IEl1U1 td thinlc:- ot tlWI. ~cally 
211 HoSpita:is. 1'Htt of the ~ wfkj 9) ~ SM ~1c!al.ly (:finarciall.y) 
~' 'lfliY' ~ lidli&411ftC· ~ (f\a'm) f.O :neal tlWM!w... Ja. a 
MU!ti Of theii' Viait, - Gt ~ pilUmta ... ~ ml,..,,.. ntmm, to thl 
il!lipital. b '*1Vi at ~ id ~ Dy tMi.I' 'VWit, mt ... of tl1m 
llilSt !etHtfi ~lY :mr di~ ~ (14llt'll) to -..tain their 
wil-Beiftj. A ffM pa~ 'MY ~HI\ (cilltM11~) aftc' ~to tlta l'Jmpital 
~ ~ il.U.•• WtiM ~ tti' ~, tJ1lly hid at:tl.ioticnl tbat could 
ft5t Ce triated by meti~ (iMfia) I ~ tlJrly ~ to folloGf pmdlint belalth 
jifacfieee (W%'e irteffic!mt • ~ ~). 
~ti~' ~~ an the ll*'t ~- tom ot -Sic:al 
fBM.~ t~ ti ·~ in1lANlltt ~) l'MCaUIM· thlly IOlt:ly hm!lle 
Pltierti 1ft> 4f'8 ~y !11 (Mva tl1e 1~ ondJ.t; ra~). ln timal of 
pta;pa or na.t:ur&l ~, a~~ of the l*t:i.anta (lmtt'Mf.111) 
~ to tie hi.llipi&WI MY ~ (clid'a\Ll.i;) ~· the ~t.a.1. statt ~ 
t!Ve them &uffieient a~Cll (lOllW) or ~ tnat ~ extfnl t.i. 
iiament 8YaE' a !EHJ .._,. p@l'iat ot WM (toll OWJt tbra dllbt) • Mxa of the 
JatieittS Dll¥ aiii8 jil5S f!M1Y (MfiNlt) ~ ~ atti'Ve at the balpital in 
*- stlllp! tftM\ .ii tl\B ift fl>Di'l'l tiW.i l:n adt.U.tierl, dcleto!S (infoiml. 
lemets) ltill ~ Im! ~ in tMk tl'MtB!lnta (lOlil'll) ~ they are 
61.se i&•slM hf '111! ~. ~ ~it.al --~ an --=eptible to 
iilil.f et ti. W.S tlitfet'el ·lJI/ \fieir paticnt&t ._ of tba afl)l.~ (infomal 
l.~ ~ dAaeas@!S tftii tile.it' pat.t.w w ~ aericual.y ill an:l ewrl 
•tntfi·~· 
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Blamirg mneylemers for the financial diffiall.ties ermmtered by a few 
of their borrowers is as illogical as coroemnirg hospitals because they treat 
peq>le who are ill an:l because sane of their patients pass away. 
I.essons fran Inf onnal Finance 
Infonnal finance persists arxi often floorishes because it resolves 
:inp:>rtant prcblems that are haniled poorly or oot at all by lOOSt formal 
financial systems. I see at least six :i.np:>rtant lessen; in this. 
Types of Services Provided 
'Ihe variety of infonnal financial arrargement:s is evidence of the broad 
ral'XJe of financial services demanied by peq>le in low-incane c:nmtries. It is 
sm:prisirg l1cM different these services are fran those eq:ihasized in 
traditianal fonnal credit programs. Deposits, small loans, an:l short-term 
loans make up a large majority of info:r:mal financial transactions-services 
that are aJJoost always absent in traditional agriall.tural credit progi:ams. I 
cxn:::lude that many traditional credit p1:og:cams may be providin;J the wnnJ mix 
of finan:ial services. 
Process Based on Discipline 
Infonnal finance aJJoost always involves participants in o:cderly processes 
that result in increasinJly disciplined behavior. Infonnal lemers 111.lSt 
discipline them.selves to save to aocurm.tl.ate fuOOs to lem. 'Ibey 111.lSt further 
discipline themselves to collect sufficient infonnation alxnt prospective 
borrowers so their loans can be made an the basis of creditworthiness. 
Informal lemers typically leant to jl.D;Je creditworthiness an:l nd>ilize 
deposits over many years arxi only survive in the blsiness if they are 
successful in developinJ these skills. Because IOOSt info:r:mal lenders have 
equity interest in their loans, they look at credit as a privilege, oot a 
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right, an! view lenlin:J as a .t181:'.iaus tl:ami ctia\ mt:lmr than as a 911J1e of 
pmsin;J aut favors. 6 
Infomal bal:rowecs also ·lam::n ,dja:ip] ine as they att:etpt to establi.Sh and 
llo1::caem Of Wcm:ml lams ·mst .·mz:n tile ~ {'JJf ~ tbr:DD#<L 
dja:iplinect :aap; tbat 1IBY JaclWJe sarin) mftae b:ln.'awinJ, .·~ ...u 
lamw .DdJta naeirinJ .lazger leans,, md .always ~ Gbligatians to sJ&tasjn 
arress to mfot:m1J finanae. 218 pctdL1cts ,af in: ' sea. discipline are :Stu:n;J 
ad~··~~ betlMelt ladats :ifti bactws. Dlese 
tmrld.n; mletiCl1Sb:ips am the famdati·on af atabJie, ml ;11hle, ad ~ 
f1nancial mrkets. 
All too o~ tmditiaml. -.,.rietaltural J.awliWJ is a t:m:ded euent tiBt 
.I ~ that Onaa1 letdetw ~ to 9!Bd .m tlDe J.ecntniJ bow tit --
lams m tbe lwlis of cmd1ta11Utlrsaa :ard that m attalt:dcn mst he qiwm m 
belpq lxlaaars ~y bd ld tiJeir cr:ediba:tidna• befam ·~ 
tbElll with J.oans, 
lllrigp 
tte large mt''ID Cf smriD:JB tbat SL1rfaae ill infal:•l fiamcial ·lladmd:s 
am m intiald:im at amt&I 4al pttp111Sities m .- 'VOimrtm:'lly ad also :8bcw 
the mi•nDJ·e :n-,; Jam of mst •fm:ml finm:l:ial l!lfJiltellB to ptUri.ae attta:t:i• 
--c tl81t'V3as. PnraJ ..... mil a.qaati.Vlf!S u.t do mt acaept deplsitsl 
iB!jilt1w real tat:es or interest ai .Jll!ln¥ +p:wt+s, am ~ lVli-nmtin; 
6AD infmml lmdm:", for exanple, lll:JUld .nl!M!r ttlin1t of passinrJ cut 
tmdr.1lds Gf 1.-. in a - .. - a! bee basis - .. been dme m '.Ddia tlmllJt#l 
bi9blY ~ ·•loan mel•" (loan fairs) • !for tl:JUld am infaraal .lelm1:' 
.,.. cmsMar du:gd.n; off ·lunrkals of lams in mae v;11·agas via~ 
u was dca9 in lfical:agm a f.f!M ·yem."S ago. 
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facilities in JOOSt central banks have :cesulted in few forma1 deposits beinJ 
:nd>ilized. Although forma1 financial systems shclll.d have a natural CX'llp.lmtive 
advantage in :nd>ilizin;J voluntary deposits, they have been l.aJ:qely designed to 
dispense cheap fums provided by qovemment am dcn:>rs. I carci.ude that 
infC>DDal. finance works well because it deperm en voluntary savin;Js (inside 
mney) , while forma1 finance often fails because it heavily relies en 
govemments or donors for fUms (outside mney) • 
Reciprocity 
Many fonns of informal finance involve recipl.'ccity: the direct tyinJ of 
loans to deposits or one person lenlin;J to another with the ~
ofttimes inplied rather than explicitly stated-that the lenler may saEday 
need to reverse roles. '1bese unutilized credit reset:Ves ai:e especiaJJy 
inportant for 1C1tr1-in:::ane people who face uncertain ocn::litions. seldan do 
traditicmal. formal credit programs provide lines of credit or more than just a 
sin;Jle loan durin;J a qiven period-they do not provide emerqency credit. I 
cx:n::lme that formal finance wcul.d be DllCh mre useful to many people in LICs 
if credit reserves were more :readily available. 
Financial rnnovations 
Informal finance is ~ with imovatia'lS that reduce transactien 
costs, especially for depositors am bor:rcrNers. It is sm:prisin;J hat quickly 
informal finance can innovate to aco miiJdate ~ corxlitions such as 
inflatien, econanic prosperity' or econanic downturns. Flexibility am 
suppleness ai:e hallmarks of informal finance. In contrast, :much of the 
innovative energy in fo:cmal financial markets is directed at regulation 
avoidmx:e, am forma1 finance is often too brittle am riqid to respord 
effectively when ec:orx:mic corxlitions C'llan;Je. 
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I cxmclt:de flD1l this that SlllBJl!t'S of faaal firm1c:ial instituticns 0t.91t 
to be JIDl'8 cmervant of inncwatims am ~ in infc:a::ml finmlce am try to 
aaul.ate many Of these innovatic:n;. 
frmm:tjm casts 
A major adrl.ew.snent of infamal fi.nan:Je is JreepinJ the bmlSBt:tiat cx:sts 
of lxu:J:owa:s am savers low by brin;in;J fimn::i.al services to places am at. 
times that axe CDM!!lllient to clients. In o:d::caat, foaal finance fccuses 
-.inly al reduclnJ tbe transacticn ccsts of the finarcial intermediary with 
little CXXDl1m given to hew th.is affects dep'Jsita.cs and b::n• ..ars. With xm:e 
~ems, clients of fozml financial intenatiarles llllst make c'.Jiel:adts am 
seek loans cm the premises of the intenEdia:r:y at tiJDes that DllY er 1lli!flf net be 
CtJnYenient to clients. 
'!be slm:p diffennces in the clistril:uti.ai of ltar&aetial costs 811CDJ . 
put:icipants in fa:ml ard .infcmnal financial JD211rirets are exce:l lent pccxiss far 
the basic arientaticn of principal actcn:s in these two nm:kets. RD:.ml. 
intJetrDailaries are •inly <Dx:a:1ied with cultivatin':J t:beir major sam:es ~ 
tums: gcvc:nment. officials, catt:ral bank 811'].oyees, an:i daxr ~; 
~ or deposit.am ot aaal.l amamts are often treated as if they wem 
pests. Infomal interJmiarl.es, in cxntrast, are a]-.,st mt.irely cxn:a tai 
at>aut sustaining quality rel.aticn5hips with their bor.ccwen or dqn;dtam. 
I cx:n:lude fraa this that :fo.r:mal lemem llJSt pay m::n mare attential to 
reducing the tz:ansectiat cxsts of~ ard dl!positcrs ani that they will 
likely not do this until larga llllClll'lt:s of aitside lllCl1eY are no lCBJE available 
to tllm.. 
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COrci,tJdj rg Remarks 
sustainable financial markets that q>erate efficiently am equitably are 
vital ~ents in :rural developnent. 'llle results of many formal 
agricultural. credit prcgrams in LICs aver the past 30 years have been 
djsawoi.ntirg, am infonnal finance appears to be doin; a better jct> of 
servic:i.rg the financial needs of many peqlle in these oamtries than do these 
formal efforts. I don't want to be misinterpreted as ai:guin; that fonnal 
financial arraI¥Jements are unnec:essaJ:y arrl that infonnal finance is sufficient 
to support develcpnent; infonnal leroers are oot the equivalent of the "n:i:>le 
savage." An efficient formal system is clearly neoessaey to intemediate over 
large distances, to efficiently manage large annmts of deposits, to make large 
loans, arxl to make lorg-tenn loans. 
My main cxmtention is that instead of tryin;J to abolish infcmnal. finarx:ial. 
arran;iements I policy makers woo).d be better advised to leam fran them. 
study:i.rg these markets will help to clarify the financial sezvioes that 
informal finance is providin; mre efficiently than formal intenDediaries arxl 
may also uncover practices that could be adopted by banks arrl cocperative that 
are providin;J financial services. Givin; three cheers for the infomal. lerr:3e.r 
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